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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN VIRGINIA
A declaratory judgment has been defined, as a judgment which
declares the rights of the parties or expresses the opinion of the
court on a question of law, without ordering anything to be done,
or requiring that an actual wrong, giving rise to a cause of action
for damages, should have been committed or suffered.
The common law refuses to allow the maintenance of any
action unless an actual wrong shall have been committed. This
has made it impossible to know for certain whether a proposed act
or course of action was legally permissible. The only thing which
could be done was to plunge ahead as if in the dark, and hope that
one's attorney was correct in his conclusion as to the applicable law.
Equity early permitted certain bills declaratory in nature,
among which were bills to remove a cloud from a particular title,
and requests for construction of trusts for the guidance of the
trustees. In 1852, England adopted a declaratory judgment pro-
cedure.2 The trend had been established; in the 1920's it became
almost a stampede. Today every jurisdiction has some type of de-
claratory judgment proceeding.
The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act was first recommend-
ed in 1921 by the Commission on Uniform State Laws and revised
in 1922. The Virginia Declaratory Judgment Act was adopted
in 1922.3 Although Virginia did not adopt the Uniform Act, the
statute is very similar in both language and intent. As a result,
decisions from states having the Uniform Act are particularly per-
suasive in Virginia courts.
The main purpose of the declaratory judgment is to enable a
man to obtain a judicial declaration of what his rights, powers,
privileges and immunities are before he has suffered an injury or
done a wrong to another. This eliminates much of the doubt and
uncertainty in legal controversies. The Supreme Court of Appeals
has held the moving purpose of the statute to be "preventive relief"4
saying that "The manifest intention of the legislature was to pro-
vide a speedy determination of actual controversies between citizens,
and to prune, as far as is consonant with right and justice, the dead
wood attached to the common law rule of 'injury before action' and
a multitude of suits to establish a single right."5
The poor reception which the Act received by the bar, char-
acterized by the almost negligible use of its facilities in the early
years of its life, led to a plea in the Virginia Law Review6 urging
attorneys to use it. Today it has become what is probably the most
widely used single procedure in our present-day system of law.
Attacks upon the constitutionality of declaratory judgment
acts have been upon the theory that they give non-judicial power
to the court by permitting them to render advisory opinions or
decide most questions. This argument has prevailed only once;
in a Michigan 'case.7
The constitutionality of the Virginia statute was questioned
in Patterson's Ex'rs v. Patterson.8 The Supreme Court of Appeals
rejected the rationale of the Michigan decision and held the Vir-
ginia statute to be constitutional. The Court placed particular
emphasis on the wording of the Virginia statute requiring an
"4actual controversy" and "actual antagonistic assertion and denial
of right"9 - phrases missing from the Michigan law.
The Court declared that the act contemplated that the parties
to the proceeding shall be adversely interested in the matter as to
which the declaratory judgment is sought and their relationship
thereto such that a judgment or decree will operate as res judicata
as to them. It does not, however, confer upon the courts the
power to render judicial decisions which are advisory only or deter-
minative of moot questions.
The Supreme Court of the United States, after seeming to
infer that it had no authority to review declaratory judgment cases
arising under state law,Io has heldxx that the declaratory judgment
was within the scope of the "case" or "controversy"x2 limitation on
its jurisdiction. This decision paved the way for the passage of the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934.13
All courts of record are empowered by the statute'4 to make
binding declarations of right. The statute confers no additional
jurisdiction and unless the court would otherwise have jurisdiction
of the subject matter and parties, the declaratory judgment proceed-
ing must fail.'s This would necessarily exclude the trial justice
court as it is not a court of record. Proceedings, would ordinarily
be in the circuit or corporations courts and therefore the exclusion
of the trial justice court is of little importance.
The Supreme Court of Appeals has expressly declared that
it does not have original jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment
action.! 6  Speaking through Justice Holt, the Court said:r7 "We
are asked on appeal to enter a declaratory judgment where no such
application was made to the court below. There can be no appeal
in a case where nothing was asked and nothing was done, and since
there is no appeal, our jurisdiction, if any, must be original. Sec-
tion 88 of our Constitution reads in part as follows: 'The court
shall have original jurisdiction in cases of habeas corpus, mandamus,
and prohibition, but in all other cases in which it shall have juris-
diction, shall have appellate jurisdiction only.' . . . . Declaratory
judgments are creatures of statutes. We are told when they may
be procured and how. In cases of actual controversy, courts of
record 'within the scope of their respective jurisdictions shall have
power to make binding adjudications.' We have no original juris-
diction."
This decision is obviously correct. The appellant had refused
to present any evidence before the State Corporation Commission.
Section 156 of the Virginia Constitution gives the Commission ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the activities of transportation companies
within this state. For the Court to have accepted any evidence
would have been to usurp the constitutional authority of the Com-
mission, and it could not have decided the case on its merits without
hearing evidence.
The Supreme Court of Appeals has permitted, in Moore v.
Moore, Iuditor,xS a party to maintain a declaratory judgment pro-
ceeding where the Court had original jurisdiction of the action, a
mandamus action. Moore, as an individual, petitioned the Court
for a writ of mandamus to compel himself, as Auditor of Public
Accounts, to pay to himself certain fees allowed by a statute, the
constitutionality of which had been questioned by the Attorney-
General. The Court entertained some doubt as to the validity of
such a procedure at common law but did not find it necessary to
pass on the point, holding that it was permissible under the Declara-
tory Judgment Act. The peculiar situation warranted a construc-
tion of the statute; there seemed to be no other adequate remedy.
'We know of no sound reason for doubting its application to this
case, even if at common law the remedy by mandamus would be
inapplicable or inadequate."x9 Thus it would appear that in any
action over which the Supreme Court of Appeals did have original
jurisdiction - mandamus, habeas corpus, and prohibition - the
Court would entertain a petition for a declaratory judgment con-
cerning the matters there involved.
The Court has expressly left open the question as to whether
the State Corporation Commission could enter a declaratory judg-
ment under the statute.zo The statute gives such authority to
"courts of record within the scope of their respective jurisdictions."a1
The Commission is vested with certain legislative, executive and
judicial functions, and is required to proceed only by due process
of law. The Supreme Court of Appeals has held2z that in pro-
ceedingsi relating to the establishment of rates and charges for trans-
portation, the Commission is not exercising the functions of a court
of record but is exercising a purely legislative function. The Court
has also heldz3 that the Commission is acting in a judicial capacity,
as a court of record, when it grants or refuses an application for a
certificate of public necessity and convenience. No less a distin-
guished judge than Justice Homes declared :24 "We shall assume
that some of the powers of the commission are judicial, and we
shall assume, without deciding, that, if it was proceeding against
the appellees to enforce this order and to punish them for a breach,
it would be sitting as a court." It is therefore submitted that the
State Corporation Commission may act under the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act in such instances as it is acting in a judicial capacity as a
court of record.
The statute25 requires an "actual controversy" for the court
to have jurisdiction and it impliedly defines an actual controversy
as a case "of actual antagonistic assertion and denial of right." The
courts have further defined an "actual controversy." First, the
person who raises a question to be settled by a declaratory judgment
must have a real interest in the subject matter in controversy.26 It
is elementary that the result must be res judicata as to the parties
and the issues.27 Whether or not there is a controversy is a ques-
tion of fact, which may be shown by the pleadings or by the
evidence.28
Assume that an actual controversy exists. Is the petitioner
entitled to a declaratory judgment as a matter of right? The Su-
preme Court of Appeals has said :29 "Whether or not jurisdiction
shall be taken under the Declaratory Judgment Act is within the
sound discretion of the trial court." The Virginia statute is silent
on this point but the decision of the court is in agreement with the
Uniform Act, which provides:30 "The court may refuse to render
or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or
decree, if rendered and entered, would not terminate the uncertainty
or controversy giving rise to the proceeding." There are two gen-
eral types of situations which may make it unlikely that a declara-
tion will prevent further litigation: (I) when one or more per-
sons who have an interest in the outcome of the action have not
been or could not be joined, and (2) when one or more issues have
not been raised, but are a part of the controversy or uncertainty.
It must be remembered the discretion of the trial court is a
sound judicial discretion subject to review by the appellate court,3'
and that the statute is to be liberally construed.32
The exercise of the trial court's discretion is exemplified by a
recent decision.33 The petitioners were the defendants in a pending
contempt of court proceeding for refusing to answer a subpoena to
give a deposition in advance of trial, when they would be present
at the trial to give their testimony. They requested a declaratory
judgment as to whether they could be so compelled to testify prior
to the trial. The court sustained a demurrer on the ground that
the identical issue was involved in the pending contempt proceeding.
The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that since the
facts and issues were identical and the issue could be determined in
either proceeding, the trial court was under no compulsion to decide
it in the declaratory judgment proceeding.
Thus it will be noted that the declaratory judgment is an al-
ternative and not an exclusive remedy, and the courts have so held.34
The mere fact that there is available to the plaintiff an ordinary
action or suit to vindicate his right, however, does not necessarily
bar a proceeding for a declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court
of Appeals in discussing this question has said:3s "The fact that
a plaintiff or complainant might, by the institution of an action or
suit or series of actions or suits, eventually, through protracted and
continuous litigation, have determined the same question that may
be determined once and for all in a declaratory judgment proceed-
ing, has never, so far as we find, been held by the courts to deprive
the courts of jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment wherein
the entire right of the parties can be determined and settled once
and fdr all." But "In common cases where a right has matured or
a wrong has been suffered, customary processes of the court, where
they are ample and adequate, should be adopted."36
The most useful field for the declaratory judgment is as a
preventive device. Thus. where there has been no injury and there-
fore no right of action exists at common law, but there is an actual
controversy, the declaratory judgment proceeding may be utilized
by the parties as a means of ascertaining what their rights, powers,
privileges or immunities are without running the risk of inflicting
an injury on another or suffering a loss.
The statute expressly mentions the use of this procedure for
obtaining interpretations of written instruments and governmental
regulations, but provides that "this enumeration does not exclude
other instances of actual .antagonistic assertion and denial of right."37
This procedure may be used to establish ownership of or other
rights in property, either personal or real. It has been used to
obtain declarations of right under deeds,3S contracts,39 deeds of
trust and separation agreements,46 leases,41 and corporate charters.42
State statutes,43 city charters,44 city ordinances,45 and franchises
or licenses46 have had their constitutionality and the rights conferred
by them determined in declaratory judgment actions. Judgments
have been obtained declaring parties to be engaged in the unlawful
practice of law47 and optometery.48 It has also been used to settle
church controversies not involving purely ecclesiastical matters or
matters outside the jurisdiction of a court of equity or law.49 In
addition to the above mentioned instances, the procedure has been
used in almost every type of legal situation. It cannot be used,
however, in criminal cases.5o
If the action or suit be one in which the court has jurisdiction
exclusive of the jurisdiction conferred by the Declaratory Judgment
Act, the venue is in the same place as in ordinary actions or suits.
However if the sole jurisdiction of the court is under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, then the defendant has the privilege of being sued
only in the place or places designated by the statute,sx eight specific
and narrowly defined venue limitations.
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment shall be
the same as that employed in the ordinary action at law or suit in
equity. Thus, for example, the burden of proof is ordinarily the
same. The running of the statute of limitations, if one is applicable,
or the presence of laches, such as would bar relief in an ordinary
action or suit, will ordinarily bar declaratory relief unless the grant-
ing of such would prevent later litigation. For example, if the
statute of limitations on a written contract had expired, the court
would dismiss a declaratory judgment proceeding to construe the
contract unless such construction was pertinent to other matters.
It now makes no difference whether one proceeds at law or
in equity. In Chick v. MacBain,52 the Supreme Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's action in overruling a demurrer to a
declaratory judgment proceeding, on the ground that the plaintiff
was seeking relief in a court of equity in a case where there was an
adequate remedy at law. This case was severely criticized53 on
the ground that it in effect destroyed the time-honored and cherished
distinctions between law and equity. This critic argued that the
legislature had not intended the Declaratory Judgment Act to have
this effect for it went into considerable detail to give both courts
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court of Appeals has recettly reiterated the
rule54 that if a case be brought properly under the Declaratory
Judgment Act that it makes no difference on which side of the
court it proceeds. Justice Gregory, after admitting that at com-
mon law only a court of equity would have had the power to
supervise the church election in question, said:55 ". . . under the
declaratory judgment statutes, there is no separation of law and
equity. . . .The procedure may be either on the law side or the
equity side. We should not be too meticulous about separating
law from equity under this procedure. . . . If a case be brought
properly under our declaratory judgment statute, it makes no differ-
ence on which side of the court it proceeds." It is significant that
there was no dissent from this holding.
It is submitted that this decision is proper. it is definitely in
accord with the current trend to do away with unnecessary formal-
ities if substantial justice can still be given. The case will be heard
by the same man; what difference does it make if we call him a
"judge" or a "chancellor"? The rights peculiar to the legal or
equitable nature of the controversy are still maintained. It should
make no difference through which door a petitioner enters the
courtroom, so long as he is properly there and the court is in a
position to grant relief. The declaratory judgment may well be
the first step in Virginia to breach the gap between law and equity.
It is worth noting that the proceeding by notice of motion is
particularly adapted to this type of proceeding. The courts have
permitted its use without comment.
The courts have also permitted adverse parties to file a joint
petition asking for a declaration of their respective rights in a par-
ticular thing or controversy.s 6 This might eliminate the use of
an interpleader action in an appropriate case where the parties are
agreeable to such a proceeding.
The Virginia statute is silent on the question of who are the
proper parties to the proceeding for a declaratory judgment. The
requirements of due process would seem to require the court to de-
cline relief where necessary parties affected were not joined or heard.
This is a prerequisite if the result is to be res judicata and serve a
practical purpose, for if parties in interest are absent or cannot be
joined, additional suits would be likely since such parties would not
be bound by the declaration. It is elementary that a person seek-
ing declaratory relief must comply at least with the rules governing
joinder of parties in ordinary actions.
Consequential relief is provided fors7 where a party refuses
to abide by the declaratory judgment. On the petition being filed,
the court, if it deems the petition sufficient, issues a rule or order
requiring the recalcitrant party to show cause why coercive relief
should not be granted. This makes it possible to obtain affirmative
relief without instituting an ordinary action and thus beginning
anew as if there had been no declaratory judgment.
The section of the Act on jury TrialsS merely supplements the
earlier provisions declaring that the procedure for obtaining a declar-
atory judgment shall be identical with that in the ordinary action at
law or suit in equity. The rights of the parties to a jury trial are
retained, and it is probable that, as in any ordinary action, the
right to the jury would be deemed waived unless expressly requested
or required by due process or statute.59 The interpretation of
Written instruments is a question of law for the court and not one
of fact for the jury. A provision for submitting the issues in the
form of interrogatories will tend to narrow the issues and make the
findings of the jury more specific.
It should be remembered that if the issue be of an equitable
nature, the findings of the jury are merely advisory. In proceed-
ings which would normally fall under the heading of actions at law,
the jury's verdict is final unless it is set aside by the court as con-
trary to the law and evidence or for some other valid reason.6o
This distinction has taken on added significance since the Supreme
Court of Appeals has held that a declaratory judgment proceeding
may be on either side of the court regardless of its legal or equitable
natu re.6 '
Section 8-583 of the Code provides: "The mere pendency of
an action or suit brought merely to obtain a declaration of rights or
a determination of a question of construction shall not be sufficient
grounds for the granting of an injunction."
This section would not apply if there are independent grounds
warranting an injunction outside of the mere pendency of the
declaratory judgment proceeding, and in such cases the injunction
may properly issue. This is demonstrated by the case of Gloth v.
Gloth.162 A husband sued his wife for divorce and at the same
time requested a construction of a separation contract between the
husband and wife and a deed of trust executed in pursuance of this
contract. He also asked for an injunction against the enforcement
of the contract and deed of trust. The wife, relying on section
8-583, demurred. The court overruled the demurrer and granted
the injunction. Thus it will be noted that where there is proper
matter for the issuance of an injunction, the request for an injunction
and a declaratory .judgment may be joined.
All matters of costs arising out of a declaratory judgment suit
.or action are left to the sound discretion of the court, to be guided
only by the particular circumstances of each case. 63
The Code further provides64 that declaratory judgments, orders
and decrees may be reviewed on writ of error or appeal. This
means that in the appellate court, as in the trial court, the procedure
is the same as in an ordinary action at law or suit in equity.
The appellate court may invoke the statute on its own volition.
This is a point of great importance. It is done to escape procedural
or other difficulties so as to decide the case upon its merits, instead
of remanding it for a new trial. It may be done only in cases
which are properly before the Supreme Court of Appeals; the record
must contain all the evidence for the Court cannot treat it as a
trial de novo and accept new evidence. Several cases in which the
court has so invoked the statute are worth noting.
In Schrnelz Bros. v. Quinn,65 the trial courts were in conflict
as to whether trustees under a deed of trust who are appointed by
the court to act as commissioners at a judicial sale of the land, were
entitled to the commission set forth in the statutes or in the deed
of trust. The appellant, who had appealed to the Court on other
grounds, had won on this point in the trial court and so had no
ground of complaint. On the petition of both parties, the Court
decided the question, holding that the ruling was possibly warranted
under the then recently adopted Declaratory Judgment Act.
In Cohen v. Rosen,66 the Supreme Court of Appeals was asked
to construe a lease. The trial court had sustained a demurrer on
the ground that an adequate remedy was available at law. The
Court held that the case presented but a single question; it admitted
that there was an adequate remedy at law, but disregarded the ques-
tion raised as to procedure and decided the case on the merits, rely-
ing on the Declaratory judgment Act in so doing.
Section 90 of the Virginia Constitution declares that "The
court may, but need not remand a case for a new trial. In any
civil case, it may enter final judgment, except that judgment for
unliquidated damages shall not be increased or diminished." Section
8-493 of the Code further authorizes the appellate court in civil
cases to "render final judgment upon the merits whenever, in the
opinion of the court, the facts before it are such as to enable the
court to attain the ends of justice."
The utilization of the Declaratory Judgment Act in such in-
stances is warranted, for to end litigation is generally a boon to
the litigants and always desirable in the public interest. Note well
that it is done only in such cases where the court has all the facts
before it so that it is not thereby transforming itself into a trial
court outside the scope of its jurisdiction.
Section 8-585 of the Code provides: "This act is declared to
be remedial; its purpose is to afford relief from the-uncertainty and
insecurity attendant upon controversies over legal rights, without
requiring one of the parties interested so to invade the rights asserted
by the other as to enable him to maintain an ordinary action there-
fore; and it is to be liberally interpreted and administered with r
view to making the courts more serviceable to the people."
This mandate has been applied equally in the trial and appellate
cou rts.
STANLEY H. MERVIS
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